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Quantifying backﬂash radiation to prevent zero-error
attacks in quantum key distribution
Alice Meda1, Ivo Pietro Degiovanni1, Alberto Tosi2, Zhiliang Yuan3, Giorgio Brida1 and Marco Genovese1
Single-photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) are the most widespread commercial solution for single-photon counting in quantum
key distribution applications. However, the secondary photon emission that arises from the avalanche of charge carriers that
occurs during the detection of a photon may be exploited by an eavesdropper to gain information without inducing errors in the
transmission key. In this paper, we characterize such backﬂash light in gated InGaAs/InP SPADs and discuss its spectral and
temporal characterization for different detector models and different operating parameters. We qualitatively bound the maximum
information leakage due to backﬂash light and propose solutions for preventing such leakage.
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INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method for sharing secret
cryptographic keys between two parties (Alice and Bob) with an
unprecedented level of security1–7. This level of security is ensured by
the laws of quantum mechanics and does not depend on the
technological resources available to an eavesdropper (Eve), provided
that the QKD implementation does not deviate from the theoretical
model. However, the security of a practical system (just as for any
other cryptographic system) strongly depends on its device imple-
mentation. Any deviation of a QKD device from the theoretical model
can be exploited as a side channel or back door 8–10.
In 2010, two zero-error attacks on commercial QKD systems were
reported that exploited defects in quantum signal encoding8 and
detection9. Shortly after, a plethora of quantum hacking attacks were
implemented using existing technologies to exploit device imperfec-
tions in a number of QKD designs (with different protocols, modules
and systems)10–16. To guarantee security, each practical implementa-
tion must be carefully analyzed and tested for its robustness against
zero-error attacks.
Single-photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) are the most widespread
commercial solution for single-photon detection in practical QKD
implementations17–26. They can also be the most vulnerable compo-
nents because they are optically exposed to Eve through the open
quantum channel. Eve can inject strong light to take control of these
detectors, thereby compromising the security of an entire QKD
system. Alternatively, Eve can also passively measure any backﬂash
light arising from avalanching carriers27 to learn the detected bit value
(Figure 1). Backﬂashes have been shown to exist in both InGaAs/InP
and Si SPADs27–30. However, these demonstrations are limited to free-
space detectors, and no experiments have been performed on ﬁber-
pigtailed SPADs, which are the detectors of choice in all existing
commercial QKD systems because of their practicality.
Here, we present the ﬁrst characterization of backﬂash light in ﬁber-
pigtailed InGaAs SPADs from various manufacturers. We construct a
reconﬁgurable optical time-domain reﬂectometer (OTDR) operating
at the single-photon level31–35 with exceptional sensitivity. This OTDR
enables unambiguous identiﬁcation of detector backﬂashes from
conventional light back reﬂections and provides a practical way to
bound the information leakage, i.e., a fundamental step toward QKD
security. Furthermore, we show that information can be leaked
through backﬂashes when two detectors produce temporally distin-
guishable secondary emissions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The experimental setup used to analyze backﬂash light is depicted in
Figure 2. A strongly attenuated pulsed laser sends photons at 1550 nm
to the InGaAs/InP SPAD under test (DUT). The back-reﬂected light is
analyzed using our photon-counting OTDR to quantify the amount of
secondary emission photons that could serve as an information side
channel to Eve. The source is a commercial 1550-nm pulsed diode
laser with pulse width of 300 ps and an energy per pulse lower than 1
fJ. The laser output is sent to a single-mode optical ﬁber and
attenuated to the single-photon level by exploiting a ﬁber-coupled
variable optical attenuator (with a maximum attenuation of 60 dB)
combined with an additional 20-dB attenuation from a 99:1 ﬁber
coupler.
We analyzed the back-reﬂected and backﬂash light of two different
InGaAs/InP detectors. The ﬁrst one, DUT1, is a prototype single-
photon detection module36; the second one, DUT2, is the commercial
IdQuantique ID201, widely used in research laboratories. Both
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detectors are pigtailed and operate in gated mode. These devices are
highly conﬁgurable in terms of detection efﬁciency, gate duration, and
dead time. They also exploit active quenching and allow long
avalanche durations (~10 ns). Their conﬁgurability and long avalanche
durations make them ideal for studying backﬂashes. The repetition
rate of the laser pulses and of the trigger rate of the DUTs were set to
fpg= 50 kHz using an external pulse generator. Both back reﬂections
and the DUT backﬂashes were directed by the circulator to the
measuring detector, a free-running single-photon InGaAs/InP SPAD
(IdQuantique ID220). The detector was operated with a low dark
count rate (5 kHz), a nominal quantum efﬁciency of 10% and a
timing resolution of 130 ps. The output electrical signals from the
OTDR detector and the DUT were sent to time-correlated single
photon-counting (TCSPC) electronics. Figure 3a and 3b shows traces
corresponding to the OTDR signals triggered by the laser pulses, with
an acquisition time of 60 min, for DUT1 and DUT2, respectively. The
histogram represents the returned photons (due to either backﬂashes
or back reﬂections) as a function of the time delay between the
emission of a laser pulse and its detection by the OTDR detector. The
horizontal axis represents the time for which a detected photon has
traveled. In Figure 3, the sharp peaks arise from backreﬂection at the
connections between different slices of ﬁber or between the ﬁber and
other optical elements in the path (e.g., the circulator). There is also a
rectangular or trapezoidal feature that appears only when the DUT is
switched on. We attribute this feature to the backﬂash light emitted by
the DUT during avalanches.
Each type of DUT has a unique, identiﬁable temporal proﬁle, which
reveals the type of detector and its manufacturer. We conﬁrmed this
ﬁnding by testing four additional devices of the DUT1 type and two of
the DUT2 type. Such identiﬁable backﬂash proﬁles can be exploited by
Eve to launch attacks tailored to a speciﬁc detector type.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Here, we evaluate the maximum possible information leakage PL due
to backﬂash light for QKD systems implemented with detectors of
either the DUT1 type or the DUT2 type. We consider a poorly
designed QKD system that allows complete temporal discrimination of
backﬂashes between different detectors. PL is estimated starting from
the ratio between the number of detected backﬂashes, NB, and the
corresponding total number of valid counts, NP, of the DUT. NB refers
only to backﬂash events, i.e., after background subtraction. We
consider the worst-case scenario in which Eve has ideal equipment,
i.e., equipment that is lossless and with an ideal (unit) photon
detection efﬁciency. Thus PL is evaluated as
PL ¼ NB
NPZdetZch
ð1Þ
where corrections for losses and inefﬁciencies of the OTDR system are
applied, i.e., for the detection efﬁciency of the OTDR detector, ηdet,
and for the losses in the optical channel connecting the DUT and the
OTDR detector due to the circulator and the ﬁber connections, ηch. To
be conservative, we slightly overestimate these losses and inefﬁciencies
by assuming ηchηdet= 0.05 based on their approximate evaluations. We
obtain an information leakage PL of 9.8% for DUT1 and a PL of 6%
for DUT2. These results suggest that the information that Eve can
obtain by observing backﬂash light is not negligible and that counter-
measures must be put in place.
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Figure 1 Representation of an eavesdropper attack exploiting backﬂash light.
Alice sends the photons of the key to Bob; when the photons are detected
by Bob using a SPAD, a ﬂash of light, the backﬂash, is emitted back to the
channel. Eve can use a circulator to intercept this spot of light to acquire
information about the detector that has clicked.
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Figure 2 A schematic representation of our experimental setup. A photon-counting OTDR observes backﬂash light from the SPAD under test. The source is
an attenuated pulsed laser emitting at 1550 nm. The backﬂash light is detected by a free-running InGaAs/InP detector. Time stamping of detected light is
obtained by means of a time-correlated single-photon counting (TCSPC) apparatus.
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The backﬂash light is a consequence of the carrier avalanches that
are triggered by an absorbed photon when the device is biased beyond
its breakdown voltage. This light is quenched, together with the
avalanche itself, when the detector bias is lowered below the break-
down voltage. Thus, the backﬂash intensity strongly depends on the
parameter settings of the quenching electronics. We investigated the
information leakage percentage in DUT1 for different detector
operating conditions by varying the detection efﬁciency, gate width,
and so on. The results are summarized in Figures 4 and 5. In Figure 4,
the information leakage of DUT1 is presented as a function of the
excess bias voltage. We used three different excess bias voltage settings,
namely, 3, 4.5 and 7 V, corresponding to nominal detection efﬁcien-
cies of 15%, 22% and 35%, respectively. As shown, the backﬂash
intensity increases as the excess bias of the detector increases because
the number of carriers also increases.
Figure 5 shows the information leakage as a function of the DUT
gate delay relative to the incident laser pulse (measured for delays of 2,
10 and 18 ns after the beginning of the gating window). The two sets
of data were collected for DUT1 operating at different bias voltages of
7 and 3 V. A decrease in the information leakage is observed when the
laser photons arrive at the end of the gating window. This is because
late avalanches are quenched by the falling edge of the gate window
rather than by the active quenching circuit. The same effect explains
the behavior observed when the laser peak is centered with respect to
the gating window but different gating window widths are used.
The information leakage is reduced when the width of the gating
window is comparable to the width of the temporal proﬁle of the
backﬂash emission in DUT1 (i.e., 5 ns or less). To study the spectral
distribution of the backﬂash emission, we integrated a ﬁber-optic
tunable optical ﬁlter (Santec OTF-970) into our OTDR system before
the OTDR measuring detector. The spectral range of the ﬁlter was
from 1530 to 1600 nm, and we set a passband bandwidth of 10 nm.
The results are presented in Figure 6a; the four presented proﬁles are
the temporal distributions of the backﬂash counts centered at 1530,
1550, 1570 and 1600 nm. The temporal emission proﬁle is similar to
the one obtained without spectral ﬁltering (Figure 3a) for all
wavelengths. When the ﬁlter is centered at 1550 nm, the reﬂection
peak dominates.
Figure 6b presents the total backﬂash counts as a function of the
center wavelength of the ﬁlter. The subtraction of the back-reﬂected
light was performed by measuring the laser light back reﬂected by
DUT1 with a bias voltage applied but in the absence of a gate signal.
The backﬂash emission is broadband, or at least it extends beyond the
spectral range of our tunable ﬁlter, because it originates from
the relaxation of hot carriers generated in the multiplication
region28–30. In the spectral region of our tunable ﬁlter, it is reasonably
uniform, except in the region around 1550 nm (1545–1555 nm),
where a peak is observed even after the subtraction of the laser light
back reﬂected by the DUT (see the sharp peak in Figure 6a). It is
reasonable to suppose that the sharp peak that is present even after
background subtraction is due to back-reﬂected laser light, since we
observed that the reﬂectivity of the diode varies with the applied
bias (in particular, a relative in reﬂectivity increase of almost one
order of magnitude of the SPAD surface was observed in the case of
non-polarized versus polarized, but non-gated, detector) and we
attribute this to the refractive index change in the semiconductor
material37.
This was conﬁrmed by measurements of the backﬂash spectrum
performed with a pulsed laser operating at 1570 nm as source of our
spectrally ﬁltered OTDR. In this conﬁguration, we expected to observe
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Figure 3 (a, b) The traces of the optical correlator after 60 min of
acquisition for DUT1 and DUT2, respectively. A backﬂash peak that is
unique to the particular DUT type is visible when an avalanche is triggered.
For DUT1, we set an excess bias voltage of 7 V, corresponding to a
detection efﬁciency higher than 35% and a gate width of 20 ns, whereas for
DUT2, the efﬁciency is 10% and the gate width is 100 ns. On observing
zoomed views of the backﬂash peaks for DUT1 and for DUT2, different peak
shapes are evident.
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Figure 4 Information leakage PL as a function of the excess bias voltage for
the prototype detector DUT1. The peaks of the back-reﬂected light is
presented in the inset (the continuous, dashed and dot-dashed lines
represent the cases of 7, 4.5 and 3 V, respectively); the smaller peak due to
the reﬂection of the laser light from the diode surface is relatively more
evident at low excess bias voltages.
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the sharp peak disappearing at 1550 nm and appearing at 1570 nm,
and indeed, this was exactly what occurred, conﬁrming that the sharp
peak was just due to the change in the reﬂectivity of the SPAD surface
caused by the change in its bias voltage.
CONCLUSIONS
We proved that signiﬁcant backﬂash emission occurs in commercial
InGaAs/InP single-photon detectors operating at telecom wavelengths.
These backﬂashes could potentially allow a severe security breach in a
poorly designed QKD system. Proper design and testing of QKD
systems should be implemented to avoid attacks based on backﬂashes.
Possible solutions can be based on passive optical devices38 such as
isolators, circulators or spectral ﬁlters to prevent backﬂashes leaking
out of a QKD system. We emphasize that these countermeasures
should consider the wide bandwidth of backﬂash light emission. For
example, the use of a 1-nm-wide spectral ﬁlter centered at 1550 nm
can reduce the information leakage of a DUT1-type device from 9.8%
to 0.12%, under the assumption that the intensity of the backﬂash
light is uniformly distributed throughout the spectral range under
investigation (1530–1600 nm). Adding an isolator will result in a
further attenuation of the backﬂash signal by ~ 30 dB.
Careful characterization of the spectral behavior of these optical
components is necessary to ensure their operation as countermeasures.
Following this line of thought, a combination of circulators or
isolators with interference optical ﬁlters at the input of the QKD
system should essentially nullify the information leakage due to
backﬂash light at the cost of some additional optical loss (the insertion
losses of the optical ﬁlter and of the circulator) in the QKD signal. Eve
may also attempt to intercept the backﬂash light just at the output of
Bob’s QKD box (or Bob’s security perimeter). Thus, QKD engineers
should also prevent the possibility of backﬂash light propagating in the
cladding modes by implementing cladding-mode suppression solu-
tions when necessary (in our case, the bending of our long single-
mode ﬁber and the FC connectors essentially nullify the possibility of
detecting backﬂash light propagating in the cladding). Furthermore, as
discussed in connection with Figure 3, the use of gates that are as short
as possible and small avalanches will reduce the emitted backﬂash
light. In this sense, fast-gated detectors39–44 represent an interesting
solution for QKD systems, not only in terms of speed but also because
of their much lower avalanche charges (as much as 100 times lower).
In fact, it is expected that they should produce signiﬁcantly lower
backﬂash light emission. In addition, the use of short gates makes it
more difﬁcult for Eve to temporally discriminate the backﬂash light.
Thus, testing the backﬂash behavior of fast-gated detectors would be
an interesting research direction.
For QKD applications, superconducting-nanowire single-photon
detectors are an excellent option. Indeed, in addition to their high
detection efﬁciency, their low dark count rate, and their short recovery
time45–47, it is expected that they should not produce any backﬂash
light (and thus should not allow any related information leakage).
Unfortunately, they require cryogenic temperatures for operation, and
because of the high cost of cryogenic equipment, they currently appear
unsuitable for the practical deployment of QKD systems in the
real world.
In a complete analysis of the security of a realistic QKD system
design, other sources of information leakage must be considered in
addition to backﬂashes. Eve can obtain information about the key by,
for example, measuring the spatial, spectral or temporal properties of
the transmitted qubits, exploiting the detector dependence of the
signal basis and channel losses, or manipulating the detectors9,48,49.
Once information leakage has been reduced as much as possible with
dedicated hardware-based countermeasures, the residual information
leakage can be overcome by applying privacy ampliﬁcation
protocols49–52.
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Figure 5 Information leakage as a function of the arrival time of laser
photons with respect to the gate window that triggers the DUT. The data
were collected for DUT1 operating at different bias voltages of 7 and 3 V.
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Figure 6 (a) Temporal distributions of the backﬂash counts after spectral
ﬁltering, with the ﬁlter centered at 1530, 1550, 1570 and 1600 nm.
(b) Total counts of backﬂash light in the observed spectral range (from 1530
to 1600 nm). All measurements were performed using ﬁlters with a 10-nm
bandwidth.
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